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have focused on the minimum wage—a 
policy that imposes costs on employers.
The third force was strong economic 
growth. Researchers widely agree that 
welfare reform, the EITC, and the 
economy all played significant roles, 
although they disagree about their relative 
contributions (Blank 2002; Moffitt 2002; 
Besharov 2003; Hotz and Scholz 
forthcoming).
Most single mothers with children 
have experienced growth in household 
income as a result of these changes. Blank 
(2002) documents that the poverty rates 
of single, female householders fell from 
32.2 percent in the business cycle peak 
year of 1989 to 24.7 percent by 2000. It is 
important to recognize, however, that the 
economic circumstances of mothers least 
capable of working might have 
deteriorated.
Policymakers increased employment 
of single mothers with children by 
consistently shifting program incentives 
to favor earnings from work over benefits 
from not working, using a combination of 
carrots and sticks. Single women with 
children are now expected to work.  
Policymakers also changed the 
expectations of program gatekeepers with 
respect to how success was measured. 
Program success is now defined as the 
integration of single women with children 
into the labor force.
Despite the caseload decline, both total 
government spending on low-income 
families (including spending for the 
EITC, health care, child care, and many 
other supports) and the number of 
families receiving some support have 
continued to grow (Besharov 2003, pp. 
17–19). These changes remain politically 
popular, however, because support is now 
tied to work.
Working-Age People with Disabilities
The 1990 passage of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) was a major 
victory for those who believe that 
working-age people with disabilities 
should be fully integrated into society, 
including the workforce. The intellectual 
underpinnings of this belief are that the 
most promising path to economic 
independence is through market work, 
and that the social environment is a more 
NOTE: This article highlights some of the 
research findings that have been published in 
The Decline in Employment of People with 
Disabilities: A Policy Puzzle, which the 
Upjohn Institute will publish in August. 
Stapleton and Burkhauser edited the book, 
which examines the changes in social policies 
that contributed to the employment decline of 
people with disabilities.
The transition of single women 
with children off the welfare rolls and into 
employment (see Figures 1 and 2) in the 
1990s has been described as “stunning” 
by leading policy researchers (see, for 
instance, Blank 2002). The authors in The 
Decline in Employment of People with 
Disabilities: A Policy Puzzle (Stapleton 
and Burkhauser 2003) document and 
analyze an equally stunning transition of 
working-age people with disabilities out 
of the workforce and onto disability 
income support programs (see Figures 1 
and 2), despite the upsurge in government 
rhetoric proclaiming increased 
employment and economic independence 
as a primary policy goal. Employment 
and program participation trends for both 
populations departed sharply from trends 
in the prior decade.
Single Women with Children
At the heart of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 is 
the expectation that parents of both sexes 
will work to support their families if 
necessary, and will rely on welfare only 
as a temporary last resort. That 
expectation has evolved over the past few 
decades as more and more women, 
including mothers of young children, 
have entered the labor force. It is 
embedded in many features of welfare 
reform, including time limits, work effort 
requirements, a shift in employment 
programs away from investment in 
human capital toward employment as 
soon as possible (“work first”), child care 
subsidies, block grants to states that 
create incentives to reduce caseloads by 
helping parents enter employment, and 
better access to health care for low-
income parents who work. 
Welfare reform is just one of three 
major forces that contributed to the 
employment and program participation 
trends of single mothers. The second is 
the dramatic expansion of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), a wage 
subsidy that helps employers pay low-
skilled parents more than they would be 
willing to in the absence of the credit. The 
large increase in the EITC for families 
“made work pay” for many parents with 
low skills. Previous efforts to increase pay 
There is no dispute about the 
growth in reliance of working-
age people with disabilities on 
SSDI and SSI.
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Income (SSI). These trends represent a 
real phenomenon, not an illusion.
The remaining chapters in the book 
focus on the causes of the employment 
decline. We conclude that changes in 
social policies are responsible. The most 
likely explanation is SSDI/SSI program 
expansions. Starting in 1984, and 
continuing into the early 1990s, access to 
benefits was eased. In addition, the value 
of SSDI benefits increased relative to 
wages for workers with low wages. There 
is convincing evidence that increases in 
the SSDI rolls closely track the 
employment of those who say they cannot 
work (Bound and Waidmann 2002), and 
that access expanded primarily for the 
two impairment groups (musculoskeletal 
and psychiatric) that also account for a 
very large share of growth in those 
reporting inability to work at all and 
growth in the number of low-wage 
workers on the SSDI rolls was much 
greater than for others (Autor and Duggan 
2003). 
In contrast to welfare reforms, the 
SSDI/SSI expansions have reinforced 
both the flawed premise that people with 
disabilities “cannot work,” and the 
message that “government will help as 
long as they do not help themselves.” The 
work disincentives of these programs and 
associated health insurance benefits did 
not change during this period, and there 
was no substantial increase in work 
supports. The 1999 Ticket to Work 
program and the Work Incentives 
Improvement Act partially address work 
supports and disincentives, but in ways 
that are minor by comparison to the 
welfare reforms.  Work requirements, 
time limits, and work-first policies are yet 
to be tried. The Ticket to Work program 
does create incentives for frontline 
rehabilitation workers to promote return 
to work and program exit, but this hardly 
There is much controversy 
about the ADA’s effect on the 
employment of people with 
disabilities.
powerful factor in determining 
employment outcomes than is an 
individual’s impairment. Policymakers 
and advocates now embrace the notion 
that environment rather than impairment 
is critical to employment outcomes for the 
majority of people with disabilities. Yet 
the implications of this insight with 
respect to the role of public policy in 
determining these outcomes have not 
been broadly recognized or acted upon. 
The consequences are the decline in 
employment, and increase in economic 
dependence, of people with disabilities.
The evidence of an employment rate 
decline itself is controversial, in part 
because it is so difficult to believe that a 
decline could occur despite the ADA and 
the economic expansion. Although use of 
the Current Population Survey (CPS) data 
to document trends for single women with 
children is accepted without question, the 
use of these same data to document trends 
for people with disabilities is hotly 
debated. In fact, the National Council on 
Disability recently recommended that 
“the Federal Government should not 
encourage or support the dissemination of 
employment data until a methodology for 
assessing employment rates among 
people with disabilities that is acceptable 
to leading researchers and demographers 
in the field and credible to persons with 
disabilities can be developed” (National 
Council on Disability 2002, p. 20).
One chapter in The Decline in 
Employment of People with Disabilities: 
A Policy Puzzle demonstrates that, 
although the use of a work-limitation 
question in the CPS is flawed as a 
measure of disability, the employment 
trends based on these data are very similar 
to those based on other disability 
measures (severe impairment, housework 
limitations, etc.) in other data sets defined 
consistently over time. There is no 
dispute about the growth in the reliance of 
working-age people with disabilities on 
Social Security Disability Insurance 
(SSDI) and Supplemental Security 
Figure 1 Employment Trends for Working-Age Mothers and People with 
Disabilities
SOURCE: Tabulations from the Current Population Survey. Series for women with children are for
women ages 20–65. Series for men and women with disabilities are for persons ages 25–61. 
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duration of those with disabilities who are 
already working, a lack of enforcement 
with respect to new hires, coupled with 
the cost of accommodations, substantially 
reduced overall employment of people 
with disabilities. Consistent with his 
conclusion, he reports that 1) employment 
declines for workers with disabilities in 
medium-sized firms were greater than in 
smaller firms that were exempt from the 
ADA and in large firms where the costs of 
compliance are smaller; 2) relatively high 
employment declines in states where 
ADA enforcement actions are relatively 
high; and 3) declines in employment even 
after excluding SSDI beneficiaries from 
the sample. The timing of the aggregate 
employment and program trends certainly 
compares to the incentives for states and 
local caseworkers created by welfare 
reform block grants. At a time when work 
outcomes for clients have become a 
dominant measure of performance for 
welfare caseworkers, they are hardly on 
the radar screens of frontline staff in SSA 
field offices and state Disability 
Determination Services. 
The second policy change we focus on 
in our book is the ADA itself. There is 
much controversy about the ADA’s effect 
on the employment of people with 
disabilities. DeLeire, in his chapter 
reviewing the evidence developed 
primarily by himself and Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001), argues that, although the 
ADA is likely to have increased job 
appears consistent with the ADA 
explanation (Figures 1 and 2), but, as we 
discuss, the “obvious” conclusion might 
well be wrong because of both the 
complex dynamics of the SSDI/SSI 
expansion and the effect of the 1990–
1991 recession. 
Whether the ADA has contributed to 
the decline in the employment rates of 
working-age people with disabilities is 
debatable, as is the ADA’s importance 
relative to expansions of SSDI/SSI.  
Given the evidence, however, it would be 
very hard to make the case that the ADA 
increased employer demand for workers 
with disabilities, as many hoped it would. 
The ADA was the only significant 
attempt to stimulate employer demand for 
workers with disabilities during this 
period. The ADA contrasts sharply with 
the EITC, the method used to increase 
employer demand for low-income 
parents. The EITC clearly benefits 
employers, while the ADA imposes a 
burden on them. As much as the ADA 
might be necessary to protect the rights of 
people with disabilities, we doubt that it 
can ever be an effective tool for 
increasing employer demand for workers 
with disabilities.
Conclusion
In many respects, recent developments 
in employment policy for people with 
disabilities are reminiscent of previous 
unsuccessful efforts to increase the 
employment and economic independence 
of single women with children. Both 
focused on investing in the human capital 
of their target populations through 
education, training, and rehabilitation; 
both sought to reduce the extent to which 
income and in-kind benefits are taxed 
away as earnings are increased, but fell 
far short of making work pay; neither 
built in work expectations; and both 
It would be hard to make the 
case that the ADA increased 
employer demand for workers 
with disabilities.
Figure 2 Program Participation Trends for Working-Age Mothers and People with 
Disabilities
SOURCE: AFDC/TANF Households (average monthly caseload in fiscal year) 1980–2000:
Department of Health and Human Services, “2002 Indicators of Welfare Dependence,” Appendix
A, available at <http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicators02/appa-tanf.htm>; for fiscal year 2001: Agency
for Children and Families, “Average Monthly Number of Families Fiscal Year 2001,” available at
<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/stats/familiesL.htm>. SSDI workers: Social Security Administra-
tion, “Annual Report of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2001,” available at
<http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2001/sect1b.html#table16>. SSI: recipients of
federally administered payments age 18–64 in December of year, SSA, “SSI Annual Statistical
Report, Table 3,” available at <http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi_asr/2001/
sect2.html>. All Web pages accessed 5/20/2003.
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(continued from page 2)
Evaluating Participant 
Self-Evaluation
Jeffrey Smith and Alexander Whalley 
University of Maryland
In recent years, participant self-
evaluations have gained attention as a 
complement, or substitute for, 
experimental or econometric evaluations. 
Participant evaluation has two 
advantages: 1) participants have a lot of 
information on outcomes and costs not 
available to program evaluators, and 2) 
self-evaluations cost very little relative to 
expensive econometric evaluations. The 
purpose of this research is to empirically 
assess the accuracy of self-evaluation 
versus experimental evaluation of 
programs.  The major hypothesis is that 
participants may not be very good in 
generating the counterfactuals required 
for proper evaluation.  
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sought to increase employer demand 
through approaches that impose costs on 
employers. 
This suggests that disability policy 
should follow in the footsteps of policy 
for single women with children, namely 
1) building work expectations and 
incentives into income support programs; 
and 2) stimulating employer demand 
through subsidies. That conclusion is too 
simple, however, because it ignores 
another welfare reform lesson: pro-work 
policies will not help—and could harm—
those who are least capable of working. 
This is a much more prominent concern 
for people with disabilities than for single 
women with children. Many people with 
disabilities cannot work at levels 
comparable to those expected of others, 
and there remain many who cannot work, 
or whom we would not expect to work, 
under any reasonable circumstances. 
Crafting policies that increase 
employment and economic independence 
through work for many while adequately 
protecting those least able to work is a 
more serious challenge for disability 
policy than for family welfare policy.
Yet, to ignore the lessons of welfare 
reform for the sake of protecting those 
who are least capable of working exposes 
people with disabilities to another risk, 
and ignores another lesson of welfare 
reform. That risk is the possibility that a 
future Congress and administration, faced 
with growing demands to control 
program growth, will do so by limiting 
access to, and reducing income benefits. 
Similar pressures led to substantial 
cutbacks in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Political support for policies that 
embody the message “we will help you, 
but we expect you to help yourself to the 
extent you reasonably can, and we will 
reward you for doing so” is much more 
likely to be sustained than political 
support for current policy.
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